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COMMON LAW MALPRACTICE LIABILITY OF
ACCOUNTANTS TO THIRD PARTIES
When conducting an independent audit for a client, an accountant must
provide auditing services with reasonable care, in good faith, without fraud
or collusion.' Originally, the primary function of the independent auditor
was to uncover employee theft and to reveal bookkeeping discrepancies for
the benefit of the client. 2 Today, the audit principally serves as an unbiased
indication to persons not connected with the client of a company's financial
health.3 If an accountant negligently overstates the financial position of a
company, third parties, investors, and creditors who rely upon an audit
opinion, may suffer damages. 4 While the accountant could have foreseen
the damage, most jurisdictions seldom allow third parties to recover the
damages that the accountant's negligence directly caused in a suit against
the accountant.5
Although the client hires the accountant, the present day accountant
strives to be independent from the client throughout the auditing process.
6
An accountant seeks to maintain independence from the client in order to
1. See Weiner, Common Law Liability of the Certified Public Accountant for Negligent
Misrepresentation, 20 SAN Dmao L. Rv. 233, 237 (1983)[hereinafter Weiner](discussing the
various duties owed under accounting contract by an accountant to client). Independent audit
is a broad term used to describe the outside review of management by an independent auditor.
2 J. CAREY, TIB RISE OF THE ACCOUNTING PROFESSION 175 (1970). The audit is a professional
examination, meeting certain standards, in which the auditor expresses an independent profes-
sional opinion regarding a client's financial statements. S. DAVMSON, HANDBOOK OF MODERN
AcCOUtTIG § 3-4 (1977); see infra note 18 (discussing the nature and content of financial
statements). The accountant must conduct an audit according to Generally Accepted Accounting
Principles [GAAP]. A AME ucAN INsTrruTE OF CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS, PROFESSIONAL
STANDARDS § 150 (1985)[hereinafter AICPA]. GAAP is a detailed set of procedures guiding
the performance of the audit. AICPA at § 150. The audit must meet standards of professional
quality known as Generally Accepted Auditing Standards [GAAS]. AICPA at § 150. In order
for an audit to meet GAAS, the auditor must have had adequate technical training for the
particular audit. AICPA at § 150. In all matters relating to the audit, the auditor must
maintain independence in mental attitude and must exercise due professional care. AICPA at
§ 150. In presenting the audit, the accountant must state that the accountant presented the
financial statements in accordance with GAAP. AICPA at § 150. The accountant then must
give an expression of opinion regarding the financial statements. AICPA at § 150; see infra
note 21 (analyzing various types of opinion that accountants may deliver).
2. See D. CAUSEY, JR., DuTms AND LIABIlTms OF PuBLIc AccouNTANTs 3 (1982)(describing
original purpose of audit as verification of proper management for owners of property).
3. See id. at 81(discussing primary purpose of audit).
4. Id. at 80.
5. See D. STERN, AN ACCOUTrrANT's GUIn TO MALPRACTIcE LIABnrrY 7 (1979)(class
of third parties allowed to sue accountant for malpractice is extremely small); infra notes 16-
17 and accompanying text (introduction to various jurisdictions permitting third party suits
against accountants).
6. See AICPA, supra note 1, at § 220 (general standard of accountant independence
applies to accountant's intellectual attitude as well as to appearances to the public).
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insure the reliability and correctness of the audit.7 An independent audit
acquires value, not when the accountant delivers the audited financial
statements to the client, but when the client presents the audited financial
statements to the investing public to raise investment capital.'
Despite an accountant's duty to maintain independence from the client,
a contract defines the relationship between client and accountant. 9 Parties
to a contract are in privity, acquiring rights and duties established by law.'0
At early common law the doctrine of privity barred any person not a party
to a contract from suing for negligence in performance of the contract."
7. See id.(asserting that accountant independence forms basis for establishment of
reliability and correctness and general usefulness of audit).
8. See id.(discussing role of audit and inevitability of third party use of audit); see also
Texas Tunneling Co. v. City of Chattanooga, 204 F.Supp. 821, 833 (E.D. Tenn. 1962), aff'd
in part, rev'd in part, 329 F.2d 402 (6th Cir. 1964)(concluding that growing specialization of
business functions requires more reliance by third parties in business transactions upon
representations of specialists).
9. See W. RICH, LEGAL RESPONSIBILITIES AND RIGHTS OF PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS 12-13
(1980)(in contract between accountant and client, provisions, express or implied, define ac-
countant's liability to client). An express contract term is one stated by parties to the contract,
while an implied contract term is not so stated. 1 A. CoRBN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 18
(1951)[hereinafter CoRnm]. The distinction is founded, not on legal effect, but on the way in
which mutual assent is manifested. CORBIN, supra, at § 18.
10. CoRIN , supra note 9 at § 778. Privity of contract is the relationship arising from a
binding legal agreement. Id.
11. See J. DAvIEs, CPA LIABIrry 19-47 (1983)(application of common law concepts to
accountant liability). At early common law, liability for negligence existed only between parties
in privity. See Winterbottom v. Wright, 10 M & W 109, 114-15, 152 Eng. Rep. 402, 405
(1842)(due to lack of privity, injured passenger unable to recover from contractor supplying
mail coach for negligent work done on coach). The English court in Winterbottom v. Wright rea-
soned that potential liability virtually would be limitless unless the duty of care applied only to
the parties to the contract. See Winterbottom at 114-15, 152 Eng. Rep. at 405 (1842)(describing
consequences of allowing liability without privity as absurd and outrageous). The New York
Court of Appeals created the first exception in the United States to the doctrine of privity for
the sale of inherently dangerous products. See Thomas v. Winchester, 6 N.Y. 397, 411
(1852)(New York Court of Appeals held druggist liable for labeling carelessly poison sold to
ordinary consumer as harmless medicine). In 1916, Justice Cardozo of the New York Court
of Appeals extended the exception to all products that are reasonably certain to place life and
limb in peril when made negligently. See MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382,
389, 111 N.E. 1050, 1053 (1916)(New York Court of Appeals awarded damages to injured
motorist for automobile manufacturer's negligent inspection of product). Theories of strict
liability and products liability have preempted the doctrine of privity. See E. KEETON, THE
LAW OF TORTS § 93 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter KEETON ](discussing tort and contract liability
of contracting party to third parties). The law protects a third party from negligent harm to
his person and his tangible possessions. KEETON at § 101(summarizing products liability and
strict liability); cf. 3 F. HARPER, F. JAMES & 0. GRAY, THE LAW OF TORTS 18.5 (2d ed.
1986)[hereinafter F. HARPER ](manufacturer's duty of care extends to almost any risk of
unreasonable harm).
The doctrine of privity often remains in force when a tortfeasor causes intangible economic
harm to a plaintiff. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS, § 552 comment a (1977). The doctrine
remains in cases of economic harm because enormous losses may result from circulation of a
single item of misinformation. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 552 comment a (1977). An
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The doctrine of privity no longer presents an absolute bar to recovery, and
many courts have allowed damages to parties not in privity with a negligent
party.' 2 In the area of accountants' malpractice liability, contemporary
American courts have adopted three standards to evaluate whether or not
a third party can sue an accountant. 3 Many jurisdictions follow a strict
privity standard in accordance with the early standard of strict privity.1
4
Current trends modify the strict privity standard and allow recovery in some
cases.s A majority of jurisdictions allowing third party negligence suits
accountant has no control over a client's use of a financial statement. See Gormley, The
Foreseen, The Foreseeable, & Beyond - Accountants' Liability to NonClients, 14 SaToN HALL
L. REv. 528, 553-54 (1984)[hereinafter Gormley](comparing control of business over negligence
in manufacturing process to accountants' complete lack of control over clients' records and
bookkeeping processes). Thus, each auditing task that an accountant performs has the potential
to create inordinate liability for the accountant. Gormley, supra, at 554.
12. See, e.g., Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal.2d 57, 62, 27 Cal.Rptr
697, 701, 377 P.2d. 897, 901 (1963)(privity not necessary in suit by ordinary consumer against
product manufacturer); Phipps v. General Motors Corp., 278 Md. 337, 343, 363 A.2d 955,
958 (1976)(privity not necessary in suit by consumer against automobile manufacturer); Keeton,
Products Liability: Some Observations About Allocation of Risks, 64 Mic. L. REv. 1329,
1331 (discussing eventual demise and ultimate insignificance of privity in actions by consumers
for physical harm to person or property)(1966); supra note 11 (discussing background and
subsequent erosion of doctrine of privity).
13. See Mess, Accountants and the Common Law: Liability to Third Parties, 52 Nom
DAME L. REv. 838, 850-53 (1977)[hereinafter Mess]listing the various standards that courts
adopted in cases of third party liability); infra notes 14-17 and accompanying text (discussing
three standards by which courts evaluate whether to extend accountant liability to third parties).
14. See, e.g., Nortek, Inc. v. Alexander Grant & Co., 532 F.2d 1013, 1015-16 (5th Cir.
1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1042 (1977)(applying.Florida law, lack of privity barred action
by purchaser of corporation against accountant); Koch Industries, Inc. v. Vosko, 494 F.2d
713, 725 (10th Cir 1974)(lack of privity barred action by purchaser of corporation against
corporation's accountant); Stephens Industries, Inc. v. Haskins & Sells, 438 F.2d 357, 359
(10th Cir. 1971)(in barring action against accountant, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Tenth Circuit adopted what the court terms the predominant rule); Robertson v. White,
633 F.Supp. 954, 971 (W.D.Ark. 1986)(lack of privity barred class action by 23,000 shareholders
against corporate accountant); Aeronca, Inc. v. Gorin, 561 F.Supp. 370, 376 (S.D.N.Y. 1983)(lack
of privity barred action by naval supplier against accountant of bankrupt corporation); Briggs
v. Sterner, 529 F.Supp. 1155, 1177 (S.D.Iowa 1981)(lack of privity barred action by trustee
of profit sharing trust against accountants of industrial loan company); Shofstall v. Allied
Van Lines, Inc., 455 F.Supp 351, 360 (N.D.I1 1978)(lack of privity barred action by stock
purchaser against accountant); Canaveral Capital Co. v. Bruce, 214 So.2d 505, 506 (Fla.
1968)(lack of privity barred action by lender against debtor's accountant); Investors Tax
Sheltered Real Estate, Ltd. v. Laventhol, Krekstein, Horwath & Horwath, 370 So. 2d 815,
817 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 1979), cert. denied, 381 So.2d 767 (Fla. 1980)(lack of privity barred
action by lessor against lessee's accountant); Investment Corp. of Florida v. Buchman, 208
So.2d 291, 293 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 1968), cert. dism'd, 216 So.2d 748 (Fla. 1968)(lack of privity
barred action by stock purchasers against accountant); MacNerland v. Barnes, 129 Ga.App.
367, 370-371, 199 S.E.2d 564, 566 (1973)(lack of privity barred action by ultimate purchaser
of corporation against accountant); infra notes 138 and 145 (discussing cases following the
strict privity standard in New York); notes 16 and 17 (courts rejecting strict privity standard).
See generally Annotation, Liability of Public Accountant to Third Parties, 46 ALR 3d 979,
982 (1972)(depicting strict privity standard as majority position).
15. See infra notes 16 - 17 (listing jurisdictions departing from strict privity standard);
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apply the approach set forth in the Restatement (Second) of Torts (Res-
tatement standard) allowing recovery by certain limited classes of third
parties. 6 A minority of jurisdictions disregard the strict privity standard
and follow a foreseeability standard, allowing all foreseeable third parties
to sue the accountant.
17
In Ultramares v. Touche5 , the New York Court of Appeals applied the
strict privity standard to determine an accountant's liability to third parties.' 9
Weiner, supra note 1, at 249-53 (describing current trend of cautious but inevitable extension
of accountants' liability to third parties).
16. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS, § 552 (1977). The Restatement establishes a two-
prong test to determine if a professional owes a duty of care to a third party. Id. The first
prong admits a duty only to a limited class of persons the professional intended to influence.
Id. at § 552(2)(a) (1977). The second restricts the duty to intended types of transactions. Id.
at § 552(2)(b) (1977); see infra notes 75-81 and accompanying text (describing more fully
Restatement standard for accountants' malpractice liability to third parties). See, e.g., Badische
Corp. v. Caylor, 630 F.Supp. 1196, 1198 (N.D.Ga. 1986)(rejecting strict privity rule); Merit
Insurance Co. v. Colao, 603 F.2d 654, 659 (7th Cir. 1979)(court allowed casualty insurance
company to sue accountant of company's defunct agency); Rhode Island Hosp. Trust Nat'l.
Bank v. Swartz, Bresenoff, Yavner and Jacobs, 455 F.2d 847, 851(4th Cir. 1972)(court allowed
creditor actually known to accountant to bring action against debtor's accountant); Badische
Corp v. Caylor, 630 F.Supp, 1196, 1198 (N.D.Ga. 1986)(applying Georgia law, United States
District Court for the Northern District of Georgia allowed supplier actually known to
accountant to bring suit); 999 v. Cox & Co., 574 F.Supp. 1026, 1031-32 (E.D.Mo. 1983)(United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri dismissed action for failure to allege
a particular and limited class); Ingram Industries, Inc. v. Nowicki, 527 F.Supp. 683, 684
(E.D.Ky. 1981)( United States District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky adopted
Restatement standard without comment); Seedkem Inc. v. Safranek, 466 F.Supp 340, 343
(D.Neb 1979)(court allowed creditor to bring action against debtor's accountant); Rusch
Factors, Inc. v. Levin, 284 F.Supp. 85, 91-92 (D.R.I. 1968)(court allowed corporation to bring
suit against accountant that former sole proprietor hired in anticipation of incorporation);
Brumley v. Touche, Ross & Co., 123 Ill.App.3d 636, 642, 463 N.E.2d 195, 200 (1984)(Illinois
Court of Appeals allowed shareholder member of known class of third parties to sue
accountants); Ryan v. Kanne, 170 N.W.2d 395, 401(Iowa 1969)(Supreme Court of Iowa allowed
recovery by third party actually known to accountant); Spherex, Inc. v. Alexander Grant &
Co., 122 N.H. 898, 903-04, 451 A.2d 1308, 1311 (1982)(Supreme Court of New Hampshire
allowed supplier member of actually foreseeable class to sue accountant); Haddon View Inv.
Co. v. Coopers & Lybrand, 70 Ohio St.2d 154, 156, 436 N.E.2d 212, 214 (1982)(Ohio Supreme
Court allowed limited partners to sue partnership's accountant for negligence); Shatterproof
Glass Corp. v. James, 466 S.W.2d 873, 877 (Tex.Civ.App. 1971)(court allowed plaintiff
creditor actually known to accountant to bring suit against debtor's accountant).
17. See Rosenblum, Inc. v. Adler, 93 N.J. 324, 356-57, 461 A.2d 138, 151 (1983)(court
allowed purchaser of stock in public corporation to bring negligence action against accountant);
Raritan River Steel Co. v. Cherry, Bekaert & Holland, 79 N.C. App 81, 91, 339 S.E.2d 62,
68 (1986), review granted, 316 N.C. 734, 345 SE.2d 392 (1986)(court allowed supplier's suit
against accountant on basis of tort duty defined by balancing test); Citizens State Bank v.
Timm, Schmidt & Co. 113 Wis.2d 376, -- , 335 N.W.2d 361, 366(1983)(Wisconsin Supreme
Court held that, in action by lending bank against accountant, accountant liable for all
foreseeable consequences unless court denied recovery on grounds of public policy).
18. 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441 (1931).
19. 255 N.Y. 170, 180-81, 174 N.E. 441, 444 (1931). Most commentators view the
Ultramares decision as the first significant example of a third party claim against an accountant
for negligence. See, e.g., Gruenbaum & Steinberg, Accountants' Liability & Responsibility:
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In Ultramares, Fred Stern & Company, importers and sellers of rubber,
engaged the accounting firm of Touche, Niven & Company to prepare and
certify a balance sheet.20 Upon completion of the audit, the accounting firm
supplied Fred Stern & Company with thirty-two certified copies of the
balance sheet.21 The audit reported assets in excess of 2.5 million dollars,
Securities, Criminal & Common Law, 13 Loy. L.A.L. Rv. 247, 309 (1980)(describing Ultra-
mares as starting point in discussion of accountants' common law liability to non-clients);
Weiner, supra note 1, at 235 (describing Ultramares as essential starting point in analyzing
accountant malpractice liability); Note, Accountants' Liabilities For False and Misleading
Financial Statements, 67 COLUM. L. REv. 1437, 1438 (1967)(viewing Ultramares as predominant
authority on accountants' liability for negligence).
A third party suing an accountant for negligence sues on a theory of negligent misre-
presentation. See Ultramares v. Touche, 255 N.Y. at 182, 174 N.E. at 442 (discussing legal
basis for plaintiff's claim). Early common law courts did not recognize a tort of negligent
misrepresentation. See International Prod. Co. v. Erie R.R., 244 N.Y. 331, 335-36, 155 N.E.
660, 663 (1927)(New York Court of Appeals traced history of negligent misrepresentation in
action by importer against railroad for negligently supplying incorrect information). Eventually,
courts accepted a narrow definition of negligent misrepresentation, allowing recovery in tort
when the defendant had knowledge or the equivalent of knowledge that the plaintiff sought
the information for a serious purpose. International Products, 244 N.Y. at 335-36, 155 N.E.
at 663. Furthermore, the defendant accountant must have known that the plaintiff intended
to rely upon the information, and that the reliance would harm the plaintiff should the
information prove false. International Products, 244 N.Y. at 335-36, 155 N.E. at 663. See
generally, HARPER, supra note 11, at § 7.6 (discussing liability arising from duty of persons
operating businesses to exercise care); KEETON, supra note 11, at § 107 (discussing liability of
professionals for negligent misrepresentation).
20. Ultramares, 255 N.Y. at -, 174 N.E. at 442. An accountant preparing an audit
generally works with a financial statement that the client has supplied. S. DAVIDSON, supra
note 1, at § 3-2 (1970). "Financial Statement" is a broad term intended to include a balance
sheet, an income statement, or any supporting statement of financial data that the accountant
derived from accounting records. Id. A balance sheet sets forth the assets, liabilities and equity
of a company at a given date. Id. An income statement sets forth the increase or decrease of
a company's equity arising from profit-seeking operations. Id. The financial statement often
includes a Statement of Changes in Financial Position (Statement of Changes). I. KELLOGG,
HOW To FIND NEGLIGENCE AND MISREPRESENTATIONS IN FINANCIAL STATEmENTS 5 (1983). The
Statement of Changes enumerates the changes in a company's working capital from the
beginning to the end of the reporting period. Id. The Statement of Changes does not replace
the income statement or the balance sheet. Id. Rather, the Statement of Changes supplements
the income statement and the balance sheet. Id.
21. Ultramares, 255 N.Y. at 174, 174 N.E. at 442. After conducting an audit, an
accountant delivers an opinion that certifies the work that the accountant has done. AICPA,
supra note 1, at § 150. The unqualified or certified opinion must state that the accountant
used GAAP in accordance with GAAS to determine that the financial statements fairly represent
the true financial position of the client at the time of the audit. See A AMERICAN INSTITtrrE
OF CERTIFIED PuBLIc AccouNTA~s, AUDITING STADARDS § 509.07 (1985)[hereinafter STAND-
ARDs](setting forth example of audit opinion). An accountant instead may deliver a qualified
opinion, an adverse opinion, or a disclaimer of opinion. Id. at § 509.04. A qualified opinion
states that except for certain departures from GAAP that are listed in detail, the financial
statements give a fair representation of the client's financial position. Id. at § 509.29. An
adverse opinion states that the accountant does not believe that the financial statements fairly
represent the financial position of the client. Id. at § 509.41. A disclaimer of opinion states
that the auditor has not performed an examination sufficient in scope to allow him to deliver
an opinion. Id. at § 509.45. A disclaimer must state specifically the respects in which the audit
has departed from GAAS. Id. at § 509.46.
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with a net worth exceeding one million dollars. 22 In fact, management of
Fred Stern & Company had falsified records submitted to the accounting
firm.? The assets reported in the audit were fictitious, and the company
actually was insolvent?2
Upon receipt of the audit, Fred Stern & Company approached the
Ultramares Corporation, a factor that had only minor dealings with Fred
Stern & Co. in the past, and requested a loan.2? In deciding whether to
extend a loan to Fred Stern & Company, management of the Ultramares
Corporation reviewed one of the certified balance sheets. 26 Relying upon
the favorable report, the Ultramares Corporation made unsecured loans to
Fred Stern & Company in excess of $160,000.27 Fred Stem & Company
subsequently defaulted on the loans and filed in bankruptcy.?
Shortly thereafter, Ultramares brought suit in New York against the
defendant accounting firm, charging negligence in the preparation of the
audit.29 At trial, the plaintiff further claimed that the accounting firm had
committed fraud in the preparation of the Fred Stern & Company balance
sheet.30 Reserving decision on the defendants' motion to dismiss, the trial
judge dismissed the fraud charge and submitted the negligence charge to
the jury.3 The jury decided in favor of the plaintiff. 2 The trial judge,
however, set aside the jury verdict.33 On appeal, the appellate division
affirmed the dismissal of the fraud action, but reversed the dismissal of the
22. Ultramares, 255 N.Y. at 174, 174 N.E. at 442.
23. Ultramares, 255 N.Y. at 175-76, 174 N.E. at 442.
24. Id.
25. Id., 255 N.Y. at 177, 174 N.E. at 443. At common law, a factor was an agent
employed to sell goods for a principal and to receive a commission on goods sold. In re
Freeman, 294 F.2d 126, 131 (3d Cir. 1961). The modem factor is a financier who generally
lends money and takes in return an assignment of accounts receivable or some other security.
In re Freeman, 294 F.2d at 131. Factoring is the purchase of accounts receivable from a
business by a factor who assumes the risk of loss in return for some agreed discount.
Manhattan Factoring Corp. v. Orsbum, 238 Ark. 947, 385 S.W.2d 785, 789 (1965).
26. Ultramares, 255 N.Y. at 177, 174 N.E. at 443.
27. Id.
28. Ultramares, 255 N.Y. at 177, 174 N.E. at 443.
29. Id. A junior clerk of the accounting firm committed the negligence alleged in
Ultramares. Id., 255 N.Y. at 177, 174 N.E. at 443. While the accounting firm was preparing
the audit, an employee of Fred Stem & Company entered in his own handwriting entries
totalling over $700,000 in additional accounts receivable. Id. The entries were completely
fictitous, and the junior clerk accepted the information at face value. Id.
30. Id. In order to gain recovery in an action for fraudulent misrepresentation, a plaintiff
must prove that the defendant made a false representation of fact with knowledge or the
equivalent of knowledge that the statement was false. HARPIER, supra note 11, at § 7.1;
KEETON, supra note 11, at § 105. The defendant must have made the representation intending
to induce the plaintiff to act or refrain from acting, and the plaintiff must have reasonably
relied on the misrepresentation and suffered damage as a result. HARPER, supra note 11, at §
7.1; KEETON, supra note 11, at § 105.
31. Ultramares, 255 N.Y. at 176, 174 N.E. at 443.
32. Id.
33. Id.
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negligence action.14 The appellate division also reinstated the jury verdict
for the plaintiff.35
The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's dismissal of
the negligence charge, reversed the dismissal of the fraud charge and
remanded the case for further proceedings. 6 The Court of Appeals held
that an accountant had a duty to conduct his trade without fraud.3 7 The
court explained that the duty extended to all persons that the accountant
knew or should have known would use the fraudulent work product.38 The
court reasoned that the complaint had stated an actionable charge of fraud
because a jury could infer the intent necessary for fraud from a reckless
misrepresentation, amounting to gross negligence.3 9 The court further held
that the doctrine of privity barred the suit in negligence.
40
In dismissing the action for negligence, the Ultramares court acknowl-
edged that many courts, including the New York Court of Appeals, had
rejected the doctrine of privity as a bar to negligence recovery in cases of
physical injury and injury to property.41 The New York Court of Appeals
stated that relaxing the privity standard would subject the accountant
committing a simple error to an indeterminate and potentially unlimited
liability to an indeterminate class of people.4 2 The New York court indicated
that the enormous potential liability created a risk far greater than any
benefit an accountant received for performing auditing services.43 The Ul-
tramares court emphasized that an accountant is public only in the sense
that anyone may choose to engage the public accountant's service."4 The
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Ultramares, 255 N.Y. at 191, 174 N.E. at 450. The New York Court of Appeals
remanded Ultramares to allow the trial court to determine if the plaintiff could prove a valid
claim of fraud. Id.
37. Ultramares, 255 N.Y at 179, 174 N.E. at 444.
38. Id.
39. Ultramares, 255 N.Y. at 189-91, 174 N.E. at 449. Other courts have followed the
Ultramares ruling, allowing a third party to bring an action for fraud against an accountant
through a permissable inference of fraud from conduct amounting to gross negligence. See,
e.g., O'Connor v. Ludlam, 92 F.2d 50, 54 (2d Cir. 1937), cert. denied, 302 U.S. 758
(1937)(holding that, absent privity, court could hold plaintiff liable for knowingly false
representation or representation made with reckless disregard of truth or falsity); Ingram
Indus., Inc. v. Nowicki, 527 F.Supp. 683, 684 (E.D.Ky. 1981)(finding that accountant might
be liable for fraud based on wanton and reckless misstatement); State Street Co. v. Ernst, 278
N.Y. 104, 106-07, 15 N.E.2d 416, 418-19 (1938), reh. denied, 278 N.Y. 104, 16 N.E. 2d 851
(1938)(holding that accountant may be liable even when plaintiff can show no actual or
deliberate fraud); see also supra note 29 (describing nature of negligence alleged in Ultramares).
40. Ultramares, 255 N.Y. at 188-89, 174 N.E. at 449; see supra note 11 (discussing the
doctrine of privity).
41. Ultramares, 255 N.Y. at 180-81, 174 N.E. at 445.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. The term independent auditor originally paralleled the contemporary meaning of
independent contractor, distinguishing the auditor offering his services to the public from an
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court reasoned that the accountant, therefore, should owe no duty to the
public.4 5 The court further stated that the auditing service directly benefits
only the client, and any other use of the FFaudit necessarily is incidental
or collateral.4 6 The New York Court of Appeals ultimately determined that
the privity doctrine applied to accountants. 47
Subsequent to the Ultramares decision, many jurisdictions have followed
a strict privity standard in third party suits against accountants. 4 Since the
standard of privity no longer applies in cases of physical injury or of injury
to tangible property, the jurisdictions following the strict privity standard
affirm the conclusion of the Ultramares court that policy concerns protecting
the accountant from indeterminate liability outweigh the policy concerns of
protecting the public from economic injury arising out of an accountant's
actions.49 Some jurisdictions, however, do not follow the Ultramares strict
privity rule in cases of accountant malpractice liability. 0
The leading opinion advocating a relaxation of the strict privity standard
for purely economic injuries was Glanzer v. Shepard,5 In Glanzer, the
auditor exclusively employed by one company. 2 J. Cm.Ey, supra note 1, at 175. The Ultramares
court's definition of public accountant closely follows the early definition of independent
auditor. See Ultramares, 255 N.Y at 180-81, 174 N.E. at 445 (describing the accountant's role
as public only in the sense that the accountant's services are available to any person willing
to pay). Today, independent auditor refers to an auditor who is independent from the client.
See AICPA, supra note 1, at § 220 (describing accountancy profession's requirement of
independence). Unlike the independent contractor who simply performs services for a number
of clients, the contemporary independent accountant performs the function of a public guardian
to assure certainty in the investing process. See United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 465
U.S. 805, 817-18 (1984)(discussing role of Certified Public Accountant in relation to efforts
to force disclosure of accountant's tax workpapers).
45. Ultramares, 255 N.Y. at 181, 174 N.E. at 445.
46. See Ultramares, 255 N.Y. at 182-83, 174 N.E. at 445-446 (discussing rationale for
requiring privity in third party suits against accountants).
47. Id.
48. See supra note 14 (listing jurisdictions following strict privity rule).
49. Ultramares 255 N.Y. at 182-83, 174 N.E. at 445. See, e.g., Stephens Industries, Inc.
v. Haskins & Sells, 438 F.2d 357, 359 (10th Cir. 1971)( United States Court of Appeals for
the Tenth Circuit adopted what court termed predominant rule of Ultramares); Robertson v.
White, 633 F. Supp. 954, 971 (W.D.Ark. 1986)(class action by 23,000 shareholders would
create inordinate liability); Shofstall v. Allied 14 an Lines, Inc. 455 F.Supp. 351, 360 (N.D.Ill
1978)(affirming Ultramares rationale in action by stock purchaser against accountant); see also
supra note 11 (analyzing reasons for retention of strict privity standard in cases of economic
injury). But see Rusch Factors, Inc. v. Levin, 284 F.Supp. 85, 91 (D.R.I. 1968)(describing
Ultramares as an unwarranted inroad upon general principle that risk reasonably perceived
defines duty); Ryan v. Kanne, 170 N.W. 395, 401 (Iowa 1969)(Iowa Supreme Court found no
reason to exempt accountants from liability to known third parties); Gormley, supra note 11,
at 530-31 (recounting criticism of Ultramares).
50. See supra notes 16 and 17 (listing jurisdictions departing from strict privity standard).
51. 233 N.Y. 236, 135 N.E. 275 (1922). See Rusch Factors, 284 F.Supp. at 91 (describing
Glanzer decision as first example of court allowing third party to recover for economic injury);
Comment, Negligent Misrepresentation and the Certified Public Accountant: An Overview of
Common Law Liability to Third Parties, 18 SussoLK L. REv. 431, 434-35 (1984)(discussing
role of Glanzer in movement away from privity doctrine in area of accountant liability).
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sellers, Bech, Van Siclen & Company, sold 905 bags of beans to the Glanzer
brothers. 2 The Glanzer brothers agreed to pay for the beans in accordance
with a certified weight sheet5 3 The sellers engaged a firm of public weighers
to perform the weighing task and to supply the buyers with a copy of the
certificate.5 4 The weighing firm negligently overstated the weight of the
beans and, as a result, the buyers paid too much on the contract with the
seller."
The buyer brought suit in City Court of New York against the weighing
firm on a theory of negligence, requesting as damages the amount overpaid
on the contract.16 The trial judge ordered judgment for the plaintiff.5 7 The
Appellate Term reversed due to the lack of privity between the parties.
55
The Appellate Division reversed the decision of the Appellate Term and
reinstated the trial verdict.5 9 The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the
trial court." The Court of Appeals held that under the circumstances of
the case the public weighers assumed a duty to weigh goods carefully for
the benefit of the Glanzer brothers.
6'
The Glanzer court reasoned that the buyer's use of the weight certificate
was, to the weigher's knowledge, the end and aim of the weigher's contract
with the seller. 62 The court concluded, therefore, that principles of usage
and fair dealing demanded that the weigher be responsible for the negligent
performance of the weigher's duty. 63 The Court of Appeals recognized that
the court could have decided Glanzer on a strict contract theory of third
party beneficiary.64 Instead, criticizing the privity doctrine, the Court of
Interestingly, Justice Cardozo delivered the Glanzer decision for the New York Court of
Appeals only nine years before he delivered the Ultramares decision. Ultramares v. Touche,
255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441 (1931); Glanzer v. Shepard, 233 N.Y. 236, 135 N.E. 275 (1922).









61. Id., 233 N.Y. at 242, 135 N.E. at 277.
62. Id., 233 N.Y at 242, 135 N.E. at 276.
63. Id.
64. Id. In some cases, a court does not require privity to enforce a valid contract. 2
WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 347 (1959)[hereinafter WV.IsToN]. A
third party beneficiary may sue on a contract, which by its express terms, directly confers on
that party a benefit. FARNswORTH, CoNTRAcTs § 10.1 (1982)[hereinafter FAoNswVoRTH]. At
early common law, two specific types of third party beneficiaries acquired rights under contract:
creditor beneficiaries and donee beneficiaries. Id. A contract created a creditor beneficiary
when performance of the contract satisfied an actual or supposed duty of the promisee to the
beneficiary. Id. A contract created a donee beneficiary when the promisee intended to make
a gift to the beneficiary. Id. Any beneficiary not within the two definitions was an incidental
beneficiary and acquired no right under the contract. Id. More recently, the two classifications
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Appeals acknowledged the growth of the negligence theory of recovery and
declared that the duty owed by the weighing firm to the Glanzer brothers
sounded not merely in contract but in tort as well. 65 The court concluded,
therefore, that the doctrine of privity did not apply to the public weighing
firm.
6 6
In comparing the Glanzer and Ultramares decisions of the New York
Court of Appeals, many courts, attempting to reconcile the Glanzer and
Ultramares decisions, have concluded that Ultramares does not set forth an
absolute rule against accountant liability to third parties. 67 The New York
Court of Appeals in Ultramares distinguished the Glanzer decision on several
grounds. 68 The Ultramares court noted that the accounting firm, unlike the
public weighing firm in Glanzer, did not know that a specific third party,
the Ultramares Corporation, would rely on the financial statements. 69 More
importantly, the court in Ultramares stated that third party use of the
auditing product was not an end and aim of the transaction. 70 Under a
traditional third party beneficiary analysis, therefore, creditors and investors
would be incidental beneficiaries of the contract between the client and the
accountant and entitled to no direct relief from an action on the contract.7
The Ultramares court reasoned that the accountant owed no duty in contract
or in tort to the third party.72 Since the Ultramares court did not overrule
Glanzer, however, possible theories of recovery exist for third parties against
the accountant.73 An action as third party beneficiary would succeed, for
of beneficiary allowed to enforce a contract have merged into one, known as an intended
beneficiary. Id. A contract creates an intended beneficiary when the performance of the
promise will satisfy an obligation of the promisee to pay money to the beneficiary. RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 302 (1981). Alternatively, a contract creates an intended beneficiary
when circumstances indicate that the promisee intends to give the beneficiary the benefit of
the promised performance. Id.
65. Glanzer, 233 N.Y. at 242, 135 N.E. at 276.
66. Id.
67. See supra notes 16 and 17 (reciting jurisdictions rejecting the strict privity standard
found in Ultramares and adopting Restatement or simple negligence standards in third party
suits against accountants).
68. Ultramares, 255 N.Y. at 182-83, 174 N.E. at 445-46.
69. Id., 255 N.Y. at 175-76, 174 N.E. at 442.
70. Id., 255 N.Y. at 183, 174 N.E. at 445-46.
71. Id., 255 N.Y. at 183, 174 N.E. at 446. An incidental beneficiary of a contract is a
person who will benefit from the performance of a contract, but who is neither the promisee
of a contract nor a person to whom a party to the contract promises to render performance.
WmLusToN, supra note 64, at § 402. See supra note 64 (discussing evolution of concept of
intended beneficiary).
72. Ultramares, 255 N.Y. at 185, 174 N.E. at 447. The court in Ultramares acknowledged
that the legislature could impose a duty in tort without relation to privity upon accountants.
Id. at 184, 174 N.E. at 446. For example, accountants today owe a statutory duty to
purchasers of securities in public offerings when they have misstated a material fact in a
financial statement. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1983).
73. See Ultramares, 255 N.Y. at 183-84, 174 N.E. at 445-46 (distinguishing and not overruling
Glanzer). In all strict privity jurisdictions, a third party may bring a claim either under a
theory of third party beneficiary to the accountancy contract, or under a theory of negligence
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example, if a third party could allege and prove status as a direct beneficiary
of the contract.7 4
While sharing the Ultramares court's concern with indeterminate liabil-
ity, the drafters of the Restatement (Second) of Torts reasoned that the
strict privity standard should not bar absolutely extensions of accountant
liability. 7" In discussing the malpractice liability of accountants and other
professionals, the drafters concluded that a satisfactory middle ground
existed between a standard of strict privity and a standard of foreseeability,
which Ultramares had discouraged.7 6 Specifically, the drafters concluded
that a middle ground existed in cases of economic loss when a professional
has a duty to supply correct information for the guidance of others in
business transactions. 77 The drafters of the Restatement established a two-
pronged concept of duty.78 First, a professional's duty only extends to a
person or limited class of persons that the professional intends or knows
will use the misleading information. 79 Second, the duty only exists for the
type of transaction that the professional intended to influence. 0 Under the
Restatement standard, the Glanzer and Ultramares decisions remain valid. 81
so gross as to permit an inference of fraud. See J. DAVIES, CPA LiABrrm 74 (1983)( describing
legal theories under which third party may recover in strict privity jurisdictions).
74. See J. DAVIES, supra note 73, at 74 (1983)(discussing ability of third party to bring
suit as beneficiary of accountant's contract with client).
75. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 comment h (1977)(discussing extent of
professional's liability to third parties for negligent misrepresentation, focusing on concern
of indeterminate liability for professional); infra notes 77-80 and accompanying text (describing
content of Restatement standard).
76. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 comment a (1977)(comparing reasons
for not allowing third party suits with reasons justifying accountants' malpractice liability to
third parties). The drafters of the Restatement standard concluded that restrictions upon
accountants' liability would encourage the free flow of commercial information and stimulate
the economy. Id. (discussing interest of society in promoting transfer of information).
77. See id. (professional's duty to supply correct information to third parties applies
only in situation in which professional supplied information in good faith).
78. Id. at § 552 (1977). See infra note 16 (discussing two prong test of Restatement).
79. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552(2)(a)(1977).
80. Id. at § 552(2)(b)(1977).
81. See id. at § 552 comments g & h (1977)(without mentioning Ultramares or Glanzer
by name, drafters presented two hypothetical examples with facts identical to fact patterns in
Ultramares and Glanzer). In Ultramares, the accounting firm could only surmise that the
plaintiff would use the accounting firm's work product for general business purposes. See id.
at § 552 comment h (1977)(acknowledging that innumerable kinds of transactions could occur
in hypothetical identical to Ultramares). Under the Restatement test for professional liability
for negligent misrepresentation, the professional did not know the type of transaction he would
influence. Id. The professional, therefore, would not be liable to the third party plaintiff
because the plaintiff could not satisfy the second prong of the Restatement test for professional
liability. See supra note 80 and accompanying text (stating that professional's duty only extends
to type of transaction that professional intended to influence). In Glanzer, the weighers not
only intended for the Glanzer brothers to rely on the transaction, the weighers delivered the
weight certificate into the hands of the buyer. Glanzer, 233 N.Y. at 239, 135 N.E. at 276. See
RESTATEM ENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 comment g (1977)(describing direct communication
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Numerous jurisdictions have followed the Restatement approach, which
provides that an accountant owes a duty to some third parties A2 Some
courts have allowed recovery when a situation is directly analogous to that
of Glanzer, with a specifically foreseen plaintiff in circumstances that
arguably could fall within the bounds of a third party beneficiary contract
claim.83 Other courts have allowed recovery to a limited, identifiable, class
of persons of which the accountant was aware.
s4
A minority of jurisdictions have discarded the privity doctrine and
allowed negligence actions by all foreseeable third parties against accountants
to proceed on a theory of simple negligence." For example, in Biakanja v.
Irving86, the California Supreme Court asserted that all reasonably foresee-
able third parties could institute suits against a professional for negligence.
87
In Biakanja, the defendant notary public had drafted a will for the plaintiff's
brother without attesting witnesses present. 8 The notary later convinced two
witnesses to sign the will. 9 As a result of the improper attestation, a
California probate court refused the will, and the plaintiff did not receive
the bequest under the willY0 The plaintiff subsequently instituted suit against
the notary public in the Superior Court for the City of San Francisco. 9'
and delivery of information in hypothetical identical to Glanzer). The Restatement Second test
includes Glanzer in the comments, in which the drafters suggest that even with less specific
knowledge on the part of the weigher, the situation satisfied the test for negligent misrepre-
sentation. See RESTATEMENT, supra, at § 552 comment g (1977)(in hypothetical with same facts
found in Glanzer, drafters suggested that direct communication of information not necessary
to justify liability of professional). The plaintiff in Glanzer, therefore, would satisfy both
prongs of the Restatement test. Id. See supra notes 79 and 80 and accompanying text (describing
both prongs of Restatement test).
82. See supra note 16 (listing jurisdictions following the Restatement).
83. See, e.g., Rhode Island Hospital Trust National Bank v. Swartz, Bresenoff, Yavner
& Jacobs, 455 F.Sulip. at 848 (lending bank actually known to accountant); Rusch Factors,
Inc. v. Levin, 284 F.Supp. 85, 90-92 (D.R.I. 1968)(lending corporation actually known to
accountant); Ryan v. Kanne, 170 N.W.2d 395, 401 (Iowa 1969)(third party shareholders actually
known to accountant). See Gormley, supra note 11, at 542 (discussing assimilation of Glanzer
and Restatement); supra note 64 (discussing concept of third party beneficiary).
84. See, e.g., Merit Insurance v. Colao, 603 F.2d 654, 654 (7th Cir. 1979)(court held
that accountant could owe duty to class of insurance companies providing certain kind of
insurance); Seedkem, Inc. v. Safranek, 466 F.Supp 340, 345 (D.Neb. 1979)(court held that
accountant could owe duty to limited class of businesses); Haddon View Investment Co. v.
Coopers & Lybrand, 70 Ohio St.2d 154, 156, 436 N.E.2d 212, 214 (1982)(court held that
accountant owed duty to limited class of four limited partners).
85. See supra note 17 (listing jurisdictions allowing foreseeable third parties to sue
accountants).
86. 49 Cal.2d 647, 320 P.2d 16 (1958).
87. Biakanja v. Irving, 49 Cal.2d 647, -- , 320 P.2d 16, 18 (1958).
88. Biakanja at -, 320 P.2d at 17. An attesting witness is a witness who must
observe and verify the various acts necessary for the legal execution of a will. 2 W.PAGE, THE
LAW OF WsLLs § 19.74 (3d ed. 1960). In most states, a testator must sign or acknowledge his
will in the presence of attesting witnesses. Id. at § 19.73.
89. Biakanja at -, 320 P.2d at 17.
90. Id.
91. Id.
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The Superior Court granted judgment to the plaintiff upon successful proof
of economic loss resulting from the notary's negligence. 92
On appeal, the California Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the
Superior Court and directly addressed the defendant's argument that the
doctrine of privity barred the suit. 93 The Biakanja court held that the
existence of a tort duty depends upon an evaluation or balancing of certain
elements. 94 Although admittedly not giving an exhaustive list, the California
Supreme Court recited a list of factors to guide a court in determining the
existence of a duty. 95 The court determined that the first factor was the
extent to which the defendant intended the transaction to effect the plaintiff
and the foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff.9 6 The second factor that the
court suggested was the closeness of the connection between the defendant's
conduct and the injury suffered, as well as the moral blame attached to the
defendant's conduct. 97 Finally, the court included as a factor the policy of
preventing future harm.98 After balancing the elements, the California
Supreme Court held that the doctrine of privity should not apply to the
defendant Irving. 99
The California Supreme Court subsequently used the Biakanja balancing
test to determine that attorneys drafting a will owed a duty of reasonable
skill and care to beneficiaries under a will.100 Although one jurisdiction has
applied the Biakanja balancing test in a third party suit against an accoun-
tant,'0 ' no California court utilized the Biakanja test in an accountant
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Biakanja at -, 320 P.2d at 19; see infra notes 95-98 and accompanying text
(outlining factors in balancing text that Biakanja court used).





100. See Lucas v. Hamm, 15 Cal.Rptr 821, 364 P.2d 685 (1961), cert. denied, 385 U.S.
987 (1962)(beneficiaries of trust created under will sued attorney for negligence). In Lucas v.
Hamm, the defendant attorney drafted a trust that violated the Rule Against Perpetuities.
Lucas, 15 Cal.Rptr at 823, 364 P.2d at 687. Beneficiaries under the trust brought suit in the
Superior Court of San Francisco. Id. The court dismissed the action for lack of privity. Id.
The California Supreme Court reversed the dismissal of the Superior Court. Id. at 824, 364
P.2d at 688. The California Supreme Court reasoned that unless the attorney was vulnerable
to suit, an innocent party would suffer harm with no possible remedy at law. Id. The court,
however, found that as a matter of law the attorney had not been negligent because the trust
only could violate the Rule Against Perpetuities if probate lasted more than sixteen years. Id.
at 826, 364 P.2d at 690.
In Heyer v. Flaig, the California Supreme Court, citing both Biakanja and Lucas, affirmed
the right of a beneficiary to sue the decedent's attorney for negligence. Heyer v. Flaig, 74
Cal.Rptr 225, 228, 449 P.2d 161, 164(1969)(decedent's daughters brought suit against attorney
for falling to account for decedent's post-testamentary spouse). The court reasoned that if the
privity rule barred the action, the social policy of preventing future harm would not prevail.
Heyer, 74 Cal.Rptr at 229, 449 P.2d at 165.
101. See Raritan River Steel Co. v. Cherry, Bekaert & Holland, 79 N.C.App. 81, 91, 339
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malpractice suit until the recent case of International Mortgage Company
v. John P. Butler Accountancy Corporation.'2 In International Mortgage,
Westside Mortgage, Inc. (Westside) hired the John P. Butler accounting
firm (Butler) to perform an audit."0 Butler delivered unqualified financial
statements to Westside stating assets in excess of $175,000.'0 4 Westside's
primary asset was a $100,000 note secured by a deed of trust on certain
real property. 0 5 A foreclosure on the property by a prior deed of trust had
destroyed the security on the note.1 6
International Mortgage Co. (IMC) approached Westside for the purpose
of buying and selling loans on the secondary market. 07 After reviewing the
financial statements that Butler had prepared, IMC entered into a number
S.E.2d 62, 68-69 (directly adopting the Biakanja test because balancing test avoids necessity
for arbitrary determination of liability). Some courts distinguish the Biakanja balancing test
from a simple negligence test. Raritan at 91, 339 S.E.2d at 68; see also D. CAUSEY, JR., supra
note 2, at 90 (distinguishing accountant liability based upon foreseeability from accountant
liability based on weighing of policy factors). In Raritan, the North Carolina court expressly
rejected the Restatement (Second) Torts standard of liability as too restrictive. Raritan at 91,
339 S.E.2d at 68. In adopting the Biakanja standard, the court also rejected the simple
negligence theory. Raritan at 91, 339 S.E.2d at 68. As one court has pointed out, however,
the Biakanja test is nothing more than a synthesis of various definitions of duty and public
policy. International Mortgage Co. v. John P. Butler Accountancy Corp., 177 Cal.App.3d
806, 816, 223 Cal.Rptr 218, 219 (Cal.Ct.App. 1986). Since both tests spring from the same
list of factors, the difference existing between a test of simple negligence and the Biakanja
test is in title only. See Note, Negligent Misrepresentation and the Certified Public Accountant:
An Overview of Common Law Liability to Third Parties, 18 SUFFOLK L. REv. 431, 437
(1984)(aknowledging the similarity between standard of foreseeability and Biakanja test). Both
tests allow a judge to declare on a case by case basis that public policy will not permit a duty
under the particular circumstances involved in each case. Id. Cf. W. PROSSER, Tim LAW OF
TORTS, § §36, 88, 107 (2d ed. 1955)(listing portion of factors Biakanja court used in determining
duty); HARPER, supra note 11, at § 18.6 (1956)(listing remaining portion of factors Biakanja
court used in determining duty).
Although expressing a balancing test in negative terms of when a duty does not exist, a
Wisconsin court that adopted a standard of simple negligence in third party suits against
accountants recited a test similar to the Biakanja test. Citizens State Bank v. Timm, Schmidt
& Co. 113 Wis.2d 376, -- , 335 N.W.2d 361, at 366. Under the Wisconsin test, a court will
impose no duty as a matter of public policy when the injury is too remote from, or out of
proportion with, the culpability of the negligent tortfeasor. Citizens State, 113 Wis.2d at -- ,
335 N.W.2d at 366. The Wisconsin court would not impose a duty when allowance of recovery
would open the way for fraudulent claims, or when the recovery would be so large and so
limitless that the court could find no sensible or just stopping point. Id.
102. 177 Cal.App.3d 806, 821, 223 Cal.Rptr 218, 227 (1986).
103. International Mortgage, 177 Cal.App.3d at 810, 223 Cal.Rptr. at 219.
104. Id.
105. Id. A deed of trust is a conveyance of realty to a third person in trust to hold as
security for the payment of a debt. G. OSBORNE, G. NELsoN, & D. Wnn-4Am, REAL ESTATE
FINANcE LAW § 1.6 (1979). Deeds of trust usually contain a power of sale in the trustee that
the trustee may exercise after default on the secured debt. Id. Under most real estate recording
acts, the earliest or prior deed of trust recorded according to statutory procedure takes
precedence over all others. Id.
106. International Mortgage at 810, 223 Cal.Rptr. at 219.
107. Id.
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of contracts to buy government loans from Westside. 08 Butler had no
knowledge of IMC at the time of the audit, and IMC did not contact Butler
to verify the accuracy of the financial statements.: 9 Westside failed to
deliver the promised deeds, resulting in alleged damages of over $475,000
to IMC."0 Westside subsequently signed a promissory note to IMC for the
amount of damages."' Having paid only $40,000 on the note, the mortgage
company defaulted on the balance." 2 IMC brought suit against the account-
ing firm, alleging negligence and negligent misrepresentation in the prepa-
ration of the financial statements."' The trial judge adopted the Restatement
approach and granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment on
the ground that the accountant owed no duty to third parties not specifically
known as intended recipients of the financial statements. 114
The California Court of Appeal reversed the lower court's decision,
holding that an independent auditor owed a duty of skill and care to a
reasonably foreseeable plaintiff who relied on negligently prepared financial
statements, regardless of privity."- While recognizing the logic of the U1-
tramares decision as compelling, the court reasoned that the strict privity
standard no longer was consistent with California negligence law." 6 The
court reasoned that the Biakanja decision had supplanted the strict privity
standard in all third party claims of professional negligence and required a
case-by-case balancing approach."1 In response to the defendants' argument
supporting the Restatement position that the trial court adopted, the Court
of Appeal stated that the Restatement standard was a standard of limited
liability." 8 The court further reasoned that the limited liability standard,
like the privity standard, rested on the reluctance of common law courts to
impose liability for financial loss without privity." 9 The California court
concluded that the limitation was as inconsistent with California tort prin-
ciples as was the strict privity standard. 120
Despite criticism of the strict privity standard, no American or English
case had held an accountant liable to a third party before a 1968 Rhode
108. Id.






115. Id. at 821, 223 Cal.Rptr at 227.
116. Id.
117. Id., at 813, 223 Cal.Rptr at 221
118. Id., at 815-817, 223 Cal.Rptr at 223-24; see supra notes 77-81 and accompanying
text (discussing Restatement standard).
119. Id. at 816, 223 Cal.Rptr at 223; see supra note 11 (discussing original rationale for
strict privity standard, as well as reasons for retaining strict privity standard in cases of
economic injury).
120. International Mortgage at 817, 223 CaI.Rptr. at 224.
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Island decision.12 1 Since Ultramares, however, the rise of public ownership
has changed the business community that the accountant serves. 122 Licensing
procedures and federal securities legislation impose duties of independence
and disclosure on the accountant.123 In the wake of new responsibilities and
duties, accounting has become a multibillion dollar industry. 124 Until 1968
when a Rhode Island court refused to apply the strict privity standard to
accountants, however, no accountant experienced a corresponding increase
in legal liability to the public.' 25
The Rhode Island decision embodies the maxim that when legal prin-
ciples that once served their day expire, courts can and should create new
principles.126 In the time of Ultramares, courts already had replaced the
doctrine of privity with simple negligence theory in cases of product lia-
bility. 27 The Ultramares court refused to supplant the privity doctrine when
121. See Rusch Factors, 284 F.Supp. at 90 (federal district court adopting Restatement
standard acknowledged that no appellate court, English or American had held accountants
liable to parties not in privity); Solomon, Ultramares Revisited; A Modern Study of Account-
ants' Liability to the Public, 18 DEPAuL L. Rv. 56, 64-65 (1968)(analyzing criticism of
Ultramares decision made by innumerable scholars); Comment, Accountants' Liabilities to
Third Parties Under Common Law and Federal Securities Law, 9 B.C.L. REv. 137, 144-45
(1967)(recounting various criticisms of Ultramares).
122. See Mess, supra note 13, at 839 (arguing that individuals or small numbers of people
had managed most businesses in the past compared with large, centrally managed conglomerates
that predominate in today's business world). In the early twentieth century, closely held
businesses had little need for outside capital, and the owner was generally both manager and
investor. Id. Thus, unlike today, the accountant would perform primarily a bookkeeping task
for management. Id.
123. See, e.g., Securities Act of 1933. 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1983)(in preparing financial
statements for public offerings of stock, accountants owe duty of care to investors for misstating
material fact in financial statement);. VA. CODE ANN. § §54-85 - 54-102 (1950)(setting forth
state licensing procedures for certified public accountants, and creating State Board of Ac-
countancy to regulate accountants' practice); N.Y. EDUCATION LAW § §7400 - 7408 (McKinney
1985)(setting forth state licensing procedures for certified public accountants and creating State
Board for Public Accountants to regulate accountants' practice).
124. See Wayne, The Year of the Accountant, N.Y. Times, Jan. 3, 1982, at Fl, col. 2.
In 1981, the accounting profession received over six billion dollars in gross revenues. Id.
125. Rusch Factors, 284 F.Supp. at 90. See supra note 121 and accompanying text
(describing Rusch decision as first example of accountant's liability to third parties); see also
Mess, supra note 13, at 839 (discussing increase in accountant responsibilities and lack of
increase in accountant liability to third parties).
126. Rusch Factors, 284 F.Supp. at 90. See B.CARDOzo, Tim NATURE OF THE JUDICI.
PROCESS, 166-67 (1921)(advocating activist role for judiciary in implementing new legal prin-
ciples); infra notes 157 - 74 and accompanying text (discussion showing that privity standard
should be abandoned by judiciary).
127. See, e.g., Harriman v. New York, Lhicago & St. Louis Railroad Co., 253 N.Y. 398,
401, 171 N.E. 686, 687 (1930)(court held that railroad had obligation when building crossing
to make crossing safe for travel by public); Roserock v. General Electric Co., 236 N.Y. 227,
232, 140 N.E. 571, 574 (1923)(court held that company had duty to pack product with care
to avoid injury to others); MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 389, 111 N.E.
1050, 1053 (1916)(court held that automobile manufacturer owed duty of product inspection
to public); supra, note 11 (discussing relationship of product liability with erosion of privity
standard).
19871 1MALPRACTICE LIABILITY OF ACCOUNTANTS 203
applying the doctrine to accountants because of the need to ensure the
certainty of potential economic liability. 128 In recent years, however, the
strict privity standard has created considerable uncertainty. 29
The manner in which courts approach allegations of fraud reveals one
aspect of courts' uncertainty in the interpretation of the Ultramares deci-
sion. 30 According to the Ultramares court, an allegation of negligence may
give rise to an actioji for fraud when the evidence supports a conclusion
that the accountant could not have believed in the truthfulness of a financial
statement. 3' Commentators criticize the idea of establishing degrees of
negligence because any distinction in degrees of negligence is inherently
vague and impractical in nature. 3 2 One commentator has criticized a case
involving accountant's liability because the third party succeeded under a
theory of gross negligence amounting to fraud when the conduct in question
was, in the opinion of disinterested experts, an uncertain example of even
ordinary negligence.' Furthermore, some courts have extended the fraud
128. See Ultramares, 255 N.Y. at 179, 174 N.E. at 444 (court found that allowing third
party liability would create unreasonable liability hazard in conducting accounting profession).
One recent decision described the Ultramares court's decision to apply the strict privity standard
as a decision founded upon the social utility rationale of the need to protect and encourage
the accounting profession. See Ryan v. Kanne, 170 N.W.2d 395, 401 (Iowa, 1969)(attacking
Ultramares as an unwarranted restriction upon tort theory based upon outdated social policy
considerations).
129. See Gormley, supra note 11, at 538 (arguing that various courts' interpretations of
strict privity standard have produced results inconsistent with Ultramares).
130. See Mess, supra note 13, at 845-48 (arguing that courts use fraud theory to subvert
strict privity standard, creating uncertain results in cases of third party suits against account-
ants).
131. Ultramares, 255 N.Y. at 178, 174 N.E. at 444.
132. See KEEToN, supra note 11, at § 34(stating that degrees of negligence are vague and
impractical, adding difficulty and confusion to already uncertain standards that courts must
submit to juries); HARPER, supra note 11, at § 16.15 (stating that disagreement and confusion
mark judicial attempts to define terms such as gross negligence, even within a single juris-
diction).
133. Dohr, Some Reservations on the State Street Trust Company Case, 70 J. AccoUil-
TANc" 218 (1940). See State Street Trust Co. v. Ernst, 278 N.Y. 104, 109, 15 N.E.2d 416,
418(1958)(court affirms jury finding of gross negligence amounting to fraud). In State Street
Trust Co. v. Ernst, two officers of Pelz-Greenstein, a company engaged in financing wholesalers
or mills, presented various credit references, together with a series of financial statements
prepared by the defendant accountants, to the plaintiff to secure a line of credit. State Street,
278 N.Y. at 109-110, 15 N.E.2d at 417-18. The plaintiff subsequently advanced several
unsecured loans to Pelz-Greenstein. State Street, 278 N.Y. at 110, 15 N.E.2d at 418. In fact,
the officers of Pelz-Greenstein actively had defrauded both the accountants and the plaintiff.
State Street, 278 N.Y. at 111, 15 N.E.2d at 418. Pelz-Greenstein eventually went into
receivership, and the plaintiff only could recover half of the amount lent to Pelz-Greenstein.
State Street, 278 N.Y. at 110, 15 N.E.2d at 418.
At trial, the defendant accounting firm presented no evidence. State Street, 278 N.Y. at
111, 15 N.E.2d at 418. The jury brought a verdict against the accountants, finding that the
accountants' conduct in preparing audits for Pelz-Greenstein was so grossly negligent as to
permit an inference of fraud. State Street, 278 N.Y. at 111, 15 N.E.2d at 418. The trial judge
overturned the verdict, finding that the jury's decision was against the weight of credible
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definition found in Ultramares and allowed plaintiffs to prove gross negli-
gence as though it were an automatic substitute for fraud. 1M Without
expanding the strict privity standard, therefore, some courts have utilized
fraud claims to expand the liability of the accountant. 35 The extent of that
expansion is unclear.2
In attempting to expand accountant liability, many commentators look
to New York, a leading forum in cases involving accountant liability, 37
which still follows the strict privity standard that the New York Court of
Appeals set forth in Ultramares.38 In White v. Guarante,39 however, another
New York court modified the strict privity standard and allowed recovery
evidence. State Street, 278 N.Y. at 111, 15 N.E.2d at 418. The New York Court of Appeals
reinstated the verdict. State Street, 278 N.Y. at 128, 15 N.E.2d at 424. As one commentator
has argued, however, the uncontested evidence of the plaintiff established at worst a reasonable
case for negligence. See Dohr, supra, at 224 (analysing State Street's rationale from viewpoint
of accountant).
According to the commentator, the majority of the New York Court of Appeals misun-
derstood the accounting procedures that the plaintiff had contested. See Dohr, supra, at 222-
223 (reducing elements of accountant misconduct in State Street to nine points, and showing
how New York Court of Appeals misinterpreted either financial statement or accounting
principle at each point). The State Street decision reportedly stretches the principles of fraud
found in Ultramares to the point of intellectual dishonesty. Note, The Accountant's Liability
- For What and To Whom, 36 IowA L. Rav. 319, 328 (1951)(criticizing State Street court's
use of fraud to incur accountant liability to third parties). Because of the resulting uncertainty
in the definition of fraud, courts should state forthrightly a cause of action in negligence
rather than find fraud in merely negligent conduct. Bohlen, Should Negligent Misrepresentations
Be Treated As Negligence or Fraud?, 18 VA. L. Rv.703, 703 (1932)(stating that court should
change fraud standard to negligence standard in misrepresentation, rather than manipulate
fraud definition).
134. See C.I.T. Financial Corp v. Glover, 224 F.2d 44 (2d Cir. 1955)(dicta approving of
jury instructions that allowed assumption that gross negligence alone could create liability for
accountant); Duro Sportswear, Inc. v. Cogen, 131 N.Y.S.2d. 20, 25 (1954), aff'd. 285 App.Div.
867, 137 N.Y.S.2d 829 (1955)(New York Supreme Court held that heedlessness and wanton
disregard of normal, careful procedure replace fraud); Mess, supra note 13, at 845-48 (discussing
evolution of fraud claims in accountant liability suits).
135. See supra note 133 and 134 (listing examples of courts mishandling or misinterpreting
fraud claims by third parties against accountants).
136. See Mess, supra note 13, at 839 (arguing that courts often distort fraud claim to
allow accountant liability).
137. See Matter of DeLorean Motor Co., 56 Bankr. 936, 940 (Bankr. E.D. Mich.
1986)(recounting history of third party suits against accountants in New York and noting that
New York was most influential and active jurisdiction in area of accountants' malpractice
liability).
138. See Credit Alliance v. Arthur Anderson & Co., 65 N.Y. 2d 536, 551, 483 N.E.2d
110, 118, 493 N.Y.S.2d 435, 442-43 (1985)(reaffirming Ultramares and analyzing current trends
toward foreseeability). The New York Court of Appeals first affirmed Ultramares in State
Street Co. v. Ernst. See State Street, 278 N.Y. 104, 121, 15 N.E.2d 416, 424 (1939)(privity
barred action by corporate creditor against accountant). Accord, O'Connor v. Ludlam, 92
F.2d 50, 52 (2d Cir. 1938)(privity barred action by investors against corporation's accountant).
See also C.I.T. Financial Corp. v. Glover, 224 F.2d 44, 46 (1955)(dicta affirming O'Connor);
supra note 12 (listing strict privity standards adopted by jurisdictions other than New York).
139. White v. Guarante, 43 N.Y.2d 356, 372 N.E.2d 315, 401 N.Y.S.2d 474 (1977).
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for a third party. 140 In White, a limited partner suffered damages as a result
of an accountant's allegedly negligent audit prepared for the plaintiff's
limited partnership, and the limited partner brought suit to recover the
damages.' 4' The trial court in New York County dismissed the plaintiff's
negligence claim. 142 The New York Court of Appeals reversed the trial judge,
allowing recovery for the plaintiff.4 3 The appellate court reasoned that the
limited partner was a member of a settled and particularized class that the
defendant knew would use the report.'" Subsequent judicial interpretations
of the White decision reveal that the Ultramares standard remains in New
York, rendered more flexible by Glanzer, in cases involving accountant
liability. 45 In New York, a third party not in privity may bring an action
140. White, 43 N.Y.2d at 359-60, 372 N.E.2d at 317, 401 N.Y.S. at 476.
141. Id. In White v. Guarante, the accounting firm performed an audit for a limited
partnership, Guarante-Harrington Industries. Id. The partnership agreement for the limited
partnership stipulated that no partner could withdraw any part of that partner's share of the
partnership capital without giving thirty days notice to all other partners. Id. Over a period
of time, the two managing partners withdrew two million dollars from the partnership capital.
Id. Despite discovering the managing partners' irregular action, the accounting firm did not
notify partnership members of the withdrawals from the capital. Id. Furthermore, the account-
ing firm presented the audit in such a fashion that a reader of the financial statement would
not realize that the managing partners had withdrawn a major portion of the partnership
capital. Id. As a result, the plaintiffs did not discover the actions of the managing partners
until the managing partners had withdrawn most of the partnership assets. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 360, 372 N.E.2d at 318, 401 N.Y.S.2d at 476.
144. Id. In White, the Guarante-Harrington Industries retained the accounting firm to
perform an audit and to prepare tax returns for the limited partnership. Id. The New York
court concluded that the accountant, therefore, must have been aware that a limited partner
necessarily would rely on and make use of the audit. Id. at 361, 372 N.E.2d at 319, 401
N.Y.S.2d at 477.
145. See Credit Alliance v. Arthur Andersen & Co.. 65 N.Y.2d 536, 553, 483 N.E.2d
110, 119, 493 N.Y.S.2d 435, 440 (1985)(New York Court of Appeals reexamined and reaffirmed
principles stated in Ultramares and Glanzer). Accord Matter of DeLorean Motor Co., 56
Bankr. 936, 940 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1986)(United States Bankruptcy Court examined progres-
sion of accountant's increasing liability to third parties); Lumbard v. Maglia, 621 F.Supp.
1542, 1545,46 (D.C.N.Y. 1985)(discussing New York precedent in third party suits against
accountants). In Credit Alliance v. Arthur Andersen & Co., the plaintiffs, engaged in financing
the purchase of equpment through installment sales or leasing agreements, acquired from L.B.
Smith, Inc. (Smith) a number of audits that Arthur Andersen & Co. [Andersen] had prepared.
Credit Alliance, 65 N.Y.2d at 541, 483 N.E.2d at 111, 493 N.Y.S.2d at 436. Relying upon the
audits, the plaintiff extended credit to Smith. The audits overstated Smith's financial condition.
Smith subsequently declared bankruptcy. Id. The plaintiff brought suit in the Supreme Court
for New York County in August 1981, claiming negligence, gross negligence, and fraud. Credit
Alliance, 65 N.Y.2d at 542-43, 483 N.E.2d at 112, 493 N.Y.S.2d at 435-37. The trial court
denied Anderson's motion to dismiss the negligence claim. Id.
The New York Court of Appeals reversed the trial court and dismissed the negligence
claim. Credit Alliance, 65 N.Y.2d at 554-55, 483 N.E.2d at 120, 493 N.Y.S.2d at 445. The court
reasoned that in claims for negligence by third parties against accountants, the strict privity standard
of Ultramares remained in force. Credit Alliance, 65 N.Y.2d at 548-52, 485 N.E.2d at 115-118,
493 N.Y.2d at 440-443. According to the Credit Alliance court, Glanzer applied only in cases
in which an accountant's relationship with a third party was so close as to approach that
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for negligence against an accountant when the accountant knew that a client
planned to present the financial statements to a known party for a particular
purpose. 46 The accountant also must have understood that the third party
would rely on the financial statements.
47
The interpretation of Ultramares that New York currently has adopted
is functionally the same as a narrow interpretation of the Restatement
standard. 148 Commentators have critized even the most broad application of
the Restatement approach, because the standard leads to arbitrary results.1
49
For example, if the plaintiff in White had replaced a retiring partner after
the defendant accountant delivered the audit, the doctrine of privity would
have barred the action. 50 While the plaintiff had suffered the same damage
of privity Credit Alliance, 65 N.Y.2d at 548, 483 N.E.2d at 115, 493 N.Y.S.2d at 440. The
Credit Alliance court reviewed decisions by other jurisdictions and concluded that, to the
extent that other courts predicated holding an accountant liable to a third party upon three
criteria, the courts were consistent with Ultramares and Glanzer. Credit Alliance, 65 N.Y.2d at
554, 483 N.E.2d at 119, 493 N.Y.S.2d at 444. According to the Credit Alliance court, a court first
must find that a client had a particular purpose for an accountant's report. Id. The court then
must find that the accountant knew that the plaintiff would rely on the accountant's audit. Id.
Finally, the court must find some conduct by the accountant that linked the accountant with
the plaintiff. Id.
In an earlier decision, the New York Court of Appeals rejected an argument that White
had created a broad exception to Ultramares and Glanzer. See Aeronca, Inc. v. Gorin, 561
F.Supp 370, 377 (D.C.N.Y. 1983)(rejecting plaintiff's argument for an extension of White
based on trial court decision in Credit Alliance). The Aeronca court held that White created
a special exemption to the strict privity standard for limited partners. Aeronca, 561 F.Supp.
at 378. Credit Alliance affirmed the Aeronca court's interpretation of White. Credit Alliance,
65 N.Y.2d at 554, 483 N.E.2d at 119-120, 483 N.Y.S.2d at 442; see Lombard v. Maglia, 621
F.Supp. 1542, 1546(D.C.N.Y. i983)(subsequently affirming Credit Alliance).
146. See Credit Alliance, 65 N.Y.2d at 552-554, 483 N.E.2d at 119-120, 493 N.Y.S.2d at
442-43 (New York court set forth requirement for third party to recover from accountant for
negligence). Accord Lombard, 621 F.Supp at 1545 (subsequently affirming Credit Alliance).
147. See Credit Alliance, 65 N.Y.2d at 552-554, 483 N.E.2d at 119-120, 493 N.Y.S.2d at
442-43 (New York court set forth additional requirement for thrid party to recover from
accountant for negligence).
148. See Gormley, supra note 11, at 538 (arguing that current interpretations of Restate-
ment standard are interchangeable with New York's current reading of Ultramares).
149. See Gormley, supra note 11, at 839 (criticizing arbitrary limitations of limited class
analysis of Restatement standard). The Restatement standard, in effect, offers no protection
to persons not in an allowable limited class. Id. At the same time, members of a limited class,
such as the limited partners in White, may litigate freely claims of negligence against an
accountant. Id. Despite the importance of belonging to a limited class in an action against an
accountant, there are few guidelines to aid in defining the limited class. Id. The difference
between the acceptable limited class of all limited partners in White and one of all stock
purchasers is one only of degree. Id. In practice, the distinction between the classes is arbitrary.
Id. (speculating that the limited class in White would become unlimited if sufficient number
of limited partners invested in a partnership).
150. See White, 43 N.Y.2d at 361, 372 N.E.2d at 317, 401 N.Y.S.2d at 477-478(settled
and particularized class would include only partners in partnership at time of audit). A person
not a partner at the time the partnership contracted with the accounting firm would be a
member of an overly broad class of prospective limited partners, and privity would bar a suit
by that subsequent partner against the accountant. Id.
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arising from the same error by the accountant, the plaintiff would have
fallen outside the scope of the Glanzer exception in Ultramares, as well as
the Restatement codification of that exception, because the accountant was
not aware of the limited partner when the accountant performed the audit.'
51
Using the same rationale as the strict privity standard, the Restatement
approach restricts the accountant's liability to known or intended classes of
third parties. 52 Theoretically, courts should apply uniformly the Restatement
standard.' In practice, however, the standard has created considerable
inconsistencies among courts seeking to apply the Restatement approach.
5 4
While less stringent than the restrictions of the privity doctrine, the Res-
tatement restrictions on third party liability are arbitrary limitations that
deny recovery to third parties simply because the third parties do not fall
within a specific class of persons.' Similar to the special retention of the
privity standard for accountant liability, the Restatement standard violates
the rational judicial policy that the same criteria govern the imposition of
negligence liability, regardless of the context in which the liability arose.
15 6
Modern judicial policy has abolished the standard of strict privity in
most areas of negligence lav. -7 The application to accountants and other
professionals of the strict privity doctrine remains as an exception based on
policy determinations made in 1933 when the New York Court of Appeals
decided Ultramares.'58 The determination that accountants owe no duty to
persons other than their clients conflicts with current business practices and
with publications and standards that the accounting profession has created.
59
151. Id; see Ultramares, 255 N.Y. at 182, 174 N.E. at 447 (stating that bean weigher
intended to influence conduct of plaintiff); supra note 81 (discussing implicit inclusion of
Glanzer and Ultramares in Restatement).
152. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 552 (1977). See Note, Negligent Misrepresentation
and the Certified Public Accountant: An Overview of Common Law Liability to Third Parties,
18 SuFFoLK L. Rv. 431, 444-46 (1984)(comparing strict privity standard's harsh restriction on
liability with arbitrary limitations of Restatement standard); supra notes 148 - 51 and accom-
panying text (describing arbitrary nature of Restatement standard).
153. See Gormley, supra note 11, at 530 (Restatement standard formulated with clarity
and intended as synthesis of majority judicial view).
154. See id. (commentator discusses and lists various inconsistent interpretations of Res-
tatement approach). One commentator argues that much of the confusion arises from a failure
to distinguish between a foreseeable plaintiff, like much of tort law envisions, and a foreseen
plaintiff, like the drafters of the Restatement envisioned Id. Often, while following the
Restatement standard, a court will describe the plaintiff in terms of the more familiar concept
of foreseeability, causing confusion for readers of the opinion. Id.
155. See Gormley, supra note 11 (source describing arbitrary limitation of Restatement
standard); see also supra note 141 (describing indefinite nature of Restatement standard
restrictions); supra note 11 (discussion of strict privity standard and stringent applications).
156. See Weiner, supra note 1, at 260 (author discusses need for judicial consistency in
third party suits against accountants, thus allowing the judicial system to function without
hint of special favor or special disfavor by given courts).
157. See supra note 11 (discussing erosion of doctrine of privity).
158. See supra notes 15-17 and 121 (listing various jurisdictions no longer following
Ultramares and commentators' criticism of Ultramares rationale).
159. See Weiner, supra note 1, at 249-50 (criticizing Ultramares decision as outdated in
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While the accounting profession in the time of the Ultramares decision was
a fledgling industry of uncertain purpose or standards, the accountant is
now an integral part of the industrial economy, and the special, blanket
application of the privity standard is no longer necessary. 16
The underlying judicial rationale of all negligence theory is to deter
harmful conduct and to award relief to the innocent person who suffers
from negligent acts. 161 By restricting an accountant's liability to third parties,
a court encourages the accountant to rely exclusively on the information
that the client gives to the accountant. 62 The accountant thus may present
the accounts in an adversarial fashion, putting forward the best possible
presentation of the accounts without expressing any personal opinion. 63 The
accountant, however, does not perform an adversarial function but acts as
a public watchdog of corporate activity.'6 Rather, the accountant must
remain neutral, not performing an adversarial role, separating the client's
wishes from the auditing task and serving the interest of the investing public,
thus meeting public expectations of the accounting profession. 65 Negligence
theory encourages the accountant to remain independent, allowing trade to
move more freely. 66 If the New York Court of Appeals in Ultramares was
today's commercial setting); AICPA, supra note 1, § §220.1-220.7 (describing necessity of
accountant independence to accomodate investing public's needs).
160. See Mess, supra note 13, at 839 (describing importance of accountant to free flow
of investment capital).
161. See KEETON, supra note I1, at § 4 (describing the fundamental purpose of tort law);
supra note 101 (listing various factors that courts have balanced in determining tort liability).
162. See Candler v. Crane, Christmas & Co., [1951] All ER 426, 436 (L. J. Denning,
dissenting)(claiming that effect of majority decision was to encourage negligence and mal-
feasance by accountants and to bar action by third parties against accountant). Lord Denning's
dissenting argument in Candler v. Crane, Christmas, & Co. proved so persuasive that English
courts subsequently allowed a charge of negligence in a suit by a third party against an
accountant. See Candler v. Crane, Christmas & Co., [1951] All ER 426, 436 (L. J. Denning,
dissenting) See JEB Fasteners v. Marks, Bloom & Co., [1981] 3 All ER 289, 289 (stock
purchaser claimed reliance on accountant's negligent preparation of corporate financial state-
ments).
163. Candler, [1951] All E.R. at 436. Lord Denning argued that once you take a third
party out of consideration for the accountant the accountants only concern is to please the
client. Id. Thus, not only could the accountant accept information from the client without
question, he could interpret that information so that the client is more pleased with the results.
Id.
164. See United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 465 U.S. 805, 817-18 (1984)(court described
fiduciary duty of impartiality of accountant to investing public while unanimously determining
that tax workpapers prepared by a corporation's independent certified public accountant are
not protected from disclosure).
165. Id.; See Comment, Auditor's Responsibility for Misrepresentation: Inadequate Pro-
tection for Users of Financial Statements, 44 WAsH. L. REv. 139, 177 (1968)(arguing that civil
liability is most effective means of providing incentive to accountants to remain neutral and
to undertake adequate self-regulation to insure neutrality).
166. See Rosenblum Inc. v. Adler, 93 N.J. 324, 345, 461 A.2d 138, 151 (1983) (discussing
the deterrence effect of increased accountant liability with resulting incentive for accountant
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correct in concluding that allowing all foreseeable third parties to sue the
accountant for negligence would overcome and eventually destroy the ac-
counting industry, then public policy would require courts to restrict lia-
bility. 
167
Restriction of accountant liability, however, is possible under the Biak-
anja foreseeability test, on a case-by-case analysis rather than by an arbitrary
limit based on classification according to the size of a class. 16 More
importantly, courts now question whether an accountant's liability indeed
is limitless and inordinate. 69 Such concern may be unfounded because the
accountant does not guarantee that audited financial statements are cor-
rect. 70 The audit opinion merely assures the investor that an audit conducted
under Generally Accepted Accounting Principles [GAAP] and Generally
Accepted Auditing Standards [GAAS] did not uncover any errors.' 7 ' As the
International Mortgage court stated, the content of a financial statement
does not determine an accountant's liability. 72 Rather, the accountant is
liable in negligence for the failure to use ordinary skill and care in preparing
the audit. 73 Thus, the accountant does not become an insurer for every
disappointed investor. 7 4
to perform work more carefully). One argument supporting a restriction of accountant liability
is that the third party could easily protect himself by demanding and hiring a separate
accountant to assess audited financial statements of other businesses. See id. (discussing and
refuting various arguments against extension of accountant liability to third parties). This
argument ignores the present business climate, which routinely depends upon independent
audits. See Rosenblum at 340, 461 A.2d at 149 (discussing role of audit in current business
community).
167. See Ultramares, 255 N.Y. at 181, 174 N.E. at 444 (concluding that consequences of
accountant liability would overcome the industry, perhaps making accounting services unob-
tainable); Citizens 113 Wis.2d at -- , 335 N.W.2d at 366 (public policy may limit liability for
consequences of negligence).
168. See Biakanja, 49 Ca.2d at -- , 320 P.2d at 17 (affirming that balancing test used
by court meant to instill flexibility for court's determination of public policy); Accord Raritan,
79 N.C.App. at 91, 339 S.E.2d at 68-69 (North Carolina Supreme Court follows Biakanja
balancing test because of flexibility in balancing approach).
169. See supra note 16 (listing jurisdictions rejecting both rationale of unlimited accountant
liability and Ultramares decision altogether, adopting a foreseeability standard for accountants'
malpractice liability because foreseeability standard would put sufficient restrictions on accountant
liability).
170. See AICPA, CoMMssioN ON AuDrrOR'S RESPONSEBITmEs 45 (1978)(financial statements
can be no more reliable than the underlying accounting methodology, and professional standards
do not require auditor to investigate every supporting document).
171. See International Mortgage, 177 Cal.App.3d at 818, 223 Cal.Rptr. at 225(describing
limitations that GAAP and GAAS place upon accountants' liabilities to third parties); Rosen-
blum,93 N.J. at 339, 461 A.2d at 148 (auditor only should have to detect illegal acts that
auditor would uncover in the exercise of normal professional skill); see also supra notes 20 -
21 (describing auditing process).
172. See International Mortgage, 177 Cal.App.3d at 181, 223 Cal.Rptr. at 225 (describing
inherent limitation of accounting process upon accoutants' liability).
173. See id.(describing extent of accountants' liability to third parties under foreseeability
standard).
174. AICPA, supra note 1, at 327.13 (discussing inherent limitations of auditing process).
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Concerns about indeterminate liability are also unfounded because an
accountant may limit his liability to a large extent by using disclaimers.
17
A disclaimer would, in clear terms and with precision, state how a particular
audit did not meet proper standards, and the reasons for that failure.
176
The successful third party plaintiff in an action for negligence must prove
reasonable reliance on the audited financial material.'" The reliance require-
ment helps to limit the accountant's liability because the third party must
prove that the third party understood the audit and acted reasonably in
relying upon the audit. 78 If the accountant states in the audit that the
investigation was irregular in certain specific respects, or if the accountant
states an adverse opinion with supporting explanations, the plaintiff will
have difficulty showing that reliance upon the report was reasonable. 179 A
simple, blanket disclaimer without further explanation would not be effec-
tive. 80 Public policy would not permit an accountant to disclaim all re-
sponsibility to the accountant's clients and to third parties through reciting
a simple sentence.' 8' Furthermore, the disclaimer must be intelligible to the
One commentator has suggested that courts should impose an implied warranty of results on
accountants who have delivered an opinion that is false. Comment, Extensions of Accountant's
Liability for Negligence: One Step Closer to a New Implied Warranty of Results, 56 U. COLO.
L REv. 265, 277-86 (1985). Under the implied warranty analysis, an accountant would be
liable for the dishonesty of a client, even when the accountant could not have uncovered the
deception through reasonable, diligent effort. Id. That any court would follow a theory of
strict liability is unlikely, though the author is firmly convinced of the viability of an implied
warranty analysis. See id. (student writer discusses likelihood of courts adopting strict liability
for accouting work, as well as repercussions of strict liability). But see Solomon, supra note
121, at 89 (author dismisses any chance of strict liability for accoutning profession); Comment,
Accountant Liable to Third Party for Negligent Misrepresentation, 53 MiNN. L. REv. 1375,
1382, 83 (1969)(in discussing future of accountant liability, writer considers strict liability least
viable alternative).
175. See AICPA, supra note 1, at § 504.01(stating that if accountant cannot give general
opinion, accountant must state reasons for not giving opinion); Comment, supra note 174, at
1385 (describing disclaimers as convenient, legally acceptable means for accountant to limit
liability); supra note 20 (describing more fully types of statements accountant must give).
176. See AICPA, supra note 1, at § §504.06 - .08 (describing requirements for proper
disclaimer).
177. See KEETON, supra note 11, at § 107 (discussing elements of reasonable reliance
successful plaintiff must prove); see also Weiner, supra note 1, at 257 (acknowledging possibility
of disclaimer limiting liability of accountants to third parties.).
178. See CAusEy, supra note 2, at 95 (stating that effective disclaimer will prevent third
party from claiming reliance on portions of opinion that accountant has properly disclaimed
responsibility).
179. See Ryan, 170 N.W.2d at 404 (effective disclaimer would preclude plaintiff from
showing reasonable reliance upon disclaimed audit); Note, Accountants' Liability to Third
Parties For An Audit. 52 MARQ. L. REv. 158, 164 (1968)(accountant may limit basis for
liability to third parties by noting the limits of the accountant's investigation).
180. See CAusEY, supra note 2, at 67 (stating that courts reject contractual provisions
that exempt professionals from all liability for negligence on grounds of public policy).
181. See Ryan, 170 N.W.2d at 177 (court stated that public policy would prohibit
accountant from using disclaimer as general excuse from exercising professional care); accord
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becomes prohibitive in any given case, courts have the ability to limit
liability by determining as a matter of public policy that the law should not
allow liability.'8 7 The cost of insurance, like availability, is a matter of
concern, but accountants practice a high risk profession, and, as with other
professions, the cost of the service should reflect the risk.' 8
As with courts refusal to consider the cost of insurance, the growing
weight of authority does not accept the special application of the strict
privity standard to the accounting profession.8 9 Courts adopting the Res-
tatement standard have produced conflicting and inconsistent results.'19
Furthermore, the same arguments that have caused a growing rejection of
the privity standard also apply to the Restatement standard, which remains
a restrictive rule of arbitrary limitation.' 9' Although existing in a minority
of jurisdictions, the foreseeability standard offers a familiar, consistent, and
workable solution to the growing expansion of accountants' malpractice
liability.' 92
ALAN F. GARRISON
187. See Raritan, 79 N.C. App. at 90-91, 339 S.E.2d at 68 (stating that court using
Biakanja balancing test could determine as a matter of public policy that liability in a given
case would be too large); Note, Liability to Third Parties for Economic Injury, Privity as a
Useful Animal or a Blind Imitation of the Past, 12 Sw. 87, 123-24 (arguing that use of
insurance coupled with Biakanja balancing test sufficiently would restrict accountant's mal-
practice liability to third parties).
188. See Solomon, supra note 121, at 86-87 (describing accounting as ultrahazardous
activity with inherent risk of damage to public from accountants' error). While conceding that
extending strict liability principles to include accountants' malpractice liability was an unwork-
able proposition, one commentator has pointed out that arguments based on the inherent risk
of accounting nevertheless mitigate against restrictions of recovery based on a strict privity
standard. Id.
189. See supra notes 17 and 18 (listing jurisdictions adopting Restatement standard or
foreseeability standard in third party suits against accountants); notes 67-120 and accompanying
text (discussing rationale various courts have used in expanding accountant liability to third
parties); see also note 11 (discussing growing unpopularity of strict privity standard).
190. See supra notes 75-84 and accompanying text (discussing courts' various interpreta-
tions of Restatement standard); notes 148-56 and accompanying text (comparing inconsistent
results from application of Restatement standard).
191. See supra notes 148-51 and accompanying text (describing even liberal interpretation
of Restatement standard as arbitrary restriction upon accountant liability to third parties).
192. See supra notes 161-74 and accompanying text (discussing application of foreseeability
standard upon accountant liability to third parties; 175-80 (relating effect of disclaimers upon
accountant liability to third parties under foreseeability standard).
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average reader of a financial statement for the disclaimer to be effective. 82
In addition to limiting liability through a proper use of disclaimers, an
accountant may use insurance to protect against additional losses that would
arise with third party liability.'83 Factors that limit an accountant's liability
under a standard of foreseeability also will limit collection against insurance
policies, assuring the continued availability of currently offered insurance
coverage. 8 4 Predictions about the availability of accountant malpractice
insurance necessarily are speculative and, therefore, are not dispositive. s s
Availability of insurance is a peripheral issue in the determination of tort
liability, and courts pointedly have disregarded the insurance issue in other
areas of enterprise liability. 86 In the event that the amount of liability
Seedkem, Inc. v. Safranek, 466 F.Supp. 340, 345 (D.Neb. 1979); Spherex, Inc. v. Alexander
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courts' rejection of general disclaimers).
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Jacobs, 455 F.2d 847, 852 (4th Cir. 1972) (court held that, consistent with industry standards,
disclaimer must give clear explanation of reason for disclaimer and explanation of effect of
disclaimer upon truthfulness of audit).
183. See Rusch Factors, Inc. v. Levin, 284 F.Supp 85, 91 (D.R.I. 1968)(stating that
accountants can insure against risk of liability to third parties and spread cost of insurance to
consumer); Note, supra note 152, at 448 (availability of malpractice insurance and ability to
pass insurance costs on to general public should protect accounting profession from increased
liability to third parties). But see Briggs v. Sterner, 529 F.Supp. 1155, 1177 (S.D. Iowa
1981)(stating that accountant's cost of insuring against third party liability would exceed benefit
derived from spreading risk); Note, Third Party Liability for Negligence - The Accountant's
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that foreseeability standard will limit recovery by third parties); CAusEy, supra note 2, at 141-
144 (discussing types of malpractice insurance available to accountants); Mess, supra note 13,
at 853 (concluding that while malpractice insurance costs will rise, accountant can effectively
pass increasing cost of insurance on to consuming public); supra notes 165-182 and accom-
panying text (discussing factors that will limit liability under foreseeability standard).
185. Weiner, supra note 1, at 252-53 (arguing that current literature contains no support
for assumption that dire economic consequences will ensue if accountants are liable to third
parties for negligence); Gormley, supra note 11, at 571-73 (arguing that statements by courts
concerning availability of malpractice insurance for accountants are speculative, and pointing
to need for data comparing amounts of payments for premiums with actual losses).
186. See, e.g., Codling v. Paglia, 32 N.Y.2d 330, 341, 345 N.Y.S.2d 461, 468-69, 298
N.E.2d 622, 627-28 (1973)(stating that additional costs of liability will force manufacturer to
make safety improvements in product and safety improvement is court's paramount concern);
Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal.2d 57, 63, 27 Ca.Rptr 697, 701, 377 P.2d
897, 901 (1963)(holding that manufacturer should bear cost of injuries resulting from defective
products regardless of insurance); RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 402 comment c
(1977)(manufacturers' liability for injuries is production cost for which manufacturer may
obtain insurance protection); Weiner, supra note 1, at 252 (stating that courts, when choosing
between passing loss on to innocent victim and passing loss on to negligent party, will place
burden of showing inordinate economic consequences on negligent party). Since it is nearly
impossible to prove that insurance costs will rise inordinately, a defendant could not meet the
burden of proof without great difficulty. Id.
